Kernel space: Linux security non-modules and AppArmor

SELinux offers strict but sometimes difficult-to-manage security. Will a simpler approach, championed by SUSE, make it into the mainstream kernel?

By Jonathan Corbet, LinuxWorld.com, 07/03/07

 Start a discussion    Print article

 Comments (1)    Print article

Long-time LWN readers will know that the Linux security module (LSM) API is controversial at best. To many, it has failed in its purpose, which is enabling the development of competing approaches to hardened Linux system; the only significant in-tree security module remains SELinux. Meanwhile, the LSM interface is easily abused; since it allows the insertion of hooks into almost any system operation of interest, it can be used by other modules to provide non-security functionality. The LSM symbols are mostly exported GPL-only, but it is still possible for binary-only modules to abuse the LSM operations - and, apparently, some have done so.

SELinux hacker James Morris has been pondering this issue recently; he has also noticed that the in-tree security modules (SELinux and the small module implementing capabilities) cannot be unloaded. So, he asked, why implement a modular interface at all? He has posted a patch which turns LSM into a static API with no exported symbols. With this patch applied, any needed security "modules" must be built into the kernel; there is no longer any way to add them at run time.

There have been a few complaints, but, from the author's point of view, it does not seem like anybody has come up with a compelling reason why it must be possible to unload security modules. Instead, it has been pointed out that maintaining a coherent security state in the presence of unloadable modules is nearly impossible. So this patch would appear to have reasonably good chances of being applied. The only question, perhaps, is whether the developers feel the need to provide an extended warning period for developers and users of out-of-tree security modules.

One such module is AppArmor - the GPL-licensed security mechanism distributed by Novell. AppArmor has remained out of the tree for a long time while its developers have tried to address the various comments which have been posted over the years. A new AppArmor patch has been posted; many things have been fixed, but one of the core points remains: AppArmor still uses a pathname-based mechanism for its policy enforcement. This approach sits poorly with developers - especially those in the SELinux camp - who think that pathnames are an inherently insecure method. In their view, the only truly secure way to control access to objects is to put labels on the objects themselves.

Invalid query - session: Can't connect to local MySQL server through socket '/tmp/mysql.sock' (2)

About Us | Contact Us | Advertising Info | Terms of Service/Privacy

Copyright, 2006-2007 Network World, Inc. All rights reserved.